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I 
A common situation in developing countries in the past two decades was a 
shortage of educated manpower relative to the expressed needs of the economy. 
Many development planners felt that this skilled manpower shortage was seriouslv 
retarding the development process, and considerable resources were devoted to 
tooling up the educational system to produce more graduates in the shortest possible 
time. In recent years, however, many less developed countries have suddenly and 
apparently to their surprise found themselves with too many (relative to the ab­
sorptive capacities of their economies) rather than too few workers with inter-
mediate educational attainments. Forecasts of impending surpluses of univer-even 
sity graduates are becoming increasinglv frequent. Despite this, the people con­
tinue to demand education; by "demand for education", we shall mean the number of 
persons who would like (or whose parents wish them) to be enrolled in school under 
existing conditions and who are able to pay the direct schooling costs. 
This paper has two purposes: (1) To investigate how the demand for education 
depends on the number of educated persons in the labor force and their allocation 
between different labor markets, and (2) To explain the persistence of a strong de-
mand for education under a number of alternative specifications of the wurKiug!!; of 
the labor market with respect to educated workers. 1 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We first review the available evidence 
on private rates of return to investment in schooling in less developed countries anc 
then formulate a model of the demand for education as a function of the expected 
private return. We then construct four alternative models of labor market behavior 
1 rn general, economists concerned with education have not made explicit the 
linkage between the demand for education and the demand for educated people. A 
notable exception is Blaug (1966). 
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and derive demand for education schedules in these four models. We shall see that 
in three of the models, the private returns to education and hence the demand for 
education would be expected to remain constant or even increase with the size of 
the educated surplus. These possibilities, taken together with other factors that 
might cause the demand for education to be inelastic with respect to the supply, 
may provide an economic explanation for the sustained high demand for education in 
less developed countries despite educated unemployment and underemployment. 
Before going on, it may be useful to remark on a feature of the models formu­
lated in this paper which may seem unconventional to readers familiar with labor 
markets in such advanced countries as the U.S. In most accounts of labor.markets 
in the developed countries, wages are regarded as adjusting rapidly in response to a 
gap between supply and demand for labor and workers or employers as moving less 
1
rapidly; hence, wage changes are taken to be the primary equilibrating force. How­
ever, when one turns to the less developed countries, there is a growing body of 
evidence that wage rates in those countries adjust only slowly, not fast enough to 
bring about equilibriUiu between labor markets, with unemployment as the consequence. 
Wage stickiness may occur for either of two sets of reasons. One school of thought 
1ncludiag 
points to institutional factors which affect the bulk of the labor force,~the wide-
spread effects of minimum wage legislation, the impact of government wage scales 
throughout the modern sector of the economy, and wage gains negotiated by labor 
2 
unions. A second (and not necessarily competing) argument is that non-institutional 
circumstances -- the reduction of hiring and training costs and gains in worker 
1
A recent exception may be found in Hall (1972). 
2 
on these points, see Berg (1966), Reynolds (1969), Frank (1971), and 
Johnson (1972). 
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efficiency as wages are raised -- could cause a rural-urban wage differential and 
consequent urban unemployment in equilibrium. 1 As a stylized version of wage 
stickiness, a number of writers including Harris and Todaro (1970) and Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan (1973) have constructed models in which wages are taken as given 
and the number of workers in various labor markets adjusts in order to determine 
an equilibrium in terms of expected (lifetime) earnings on the supply side of the 
labor market. The labor market models below are formulated in this spirit of 
quantity rather than price adjustment. 
1. The Demand for Education and Private Returns 
Education is desired by different groups for different reasons: by private 
individuals who for job-related or other reasons want their children educated; 
by firms and governmental bodies who wish to employ educated persons; by policy­
makers who feel that a well-educated populace is necessary for national development; 
and by teachers who are employed by the school system. The private demand by 
families who would like their children educated up to a particular level is our cen­
tral concern in this paper. This demand is not expressed in textbook fashion wheret 
the private demand for education is minifested through the political process as 
citizens bring pressure to bear on government officials to increase the number of 
schooling spaces, not only at the given level but at prerequisite levels as well. 
The concerns of employers, development planners, and teachers in turn determine the 
willingness of the educational planners to adjust the supply of educational oppor­
tunities in response to the private demand and the speed of adjustment. 
1
These circumstances are analyzed thoroughly in Stiglitz (1972 and 1973). 
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It appears that the primarv factor motivating citizens to demand education is 
not the economic or social development of the society as a whole but rather the 
enhancement of their own personal economic and social status. 1 The demand for a 
given level of education may therefore be presumed to depend on the size of the 
expected private return to that level of schooling. 
2 
The cross-country e·vidence 
collected by Psacharopoulos (1973, p. 62) shows that private rates of return to in­
vestment in education are very high; of three levels of education for each of 
eleven3 less developed countries for which data were available, only one is less than 
. 4ten percent and most are above twenty percent. With few constraints imposed bv 
the necessity of financing educational investment by recourse to a capital market, 5 
the very high private rates of return are readily translated into a very high pri-
vate demand for education. 
1
Even as ardent a supporter of the mass demand for education as Bereday (1969)
writes that "perhaps men should not want quite so much education quite so badly,
since so many want it for the wrong reasons" but, ha continues, "whatever his motives,an individual's desire for education cannot be ignored." 
·
2
This is not to imply that citizens actually compute such returns, but rather,following Friedman (1953), they behave as if they do. Nor is it meant to imply that
the size of the private return is the onlv determinant of the demand for education.
The status, power, and prestige of being educated may be of equal or greater impor­
tance than monetary considerations. We may view these non=pecuniary factors as deter­
mining a minimum value of the demand for education and high private returns as raisingdemand above the base. 
3
These are Puerto Rico, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, India, Philippines,Thailand, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya. 
4rn most less developed countries, schooling costs are heavily and often en­
tirely subsidized. So that the out-of-pocket costs of schooling are small. However,
the high private rates of return are probably better explained on the benefit side.
Percentage wage differentials between different skill levels in less developed
countries, particularly those in Africa, are much greater than in the "advanced"
countries. 
5
This is another effect of large subsidies to education. 
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2. A Model of Educational Demand 
Let us consider a person's decision of whether or not to demand education. Sup­
pose for simplicity that we may distinguish between two groups of workers: those 
who have received at least a given level of education, and those who have received ~ 
less: we call these groups the"edurated"and "uneducated" respectively. Let us also 
suppose that there are two types of jobs: jobs which can be filled only by educated 
person~ 
1 
and jobs in which education may be a desirable but not essential qualifica-
tion; we call these "skilled" and "unskilled" jobs respectively. We consider two 
types of unskilled jobs: jobs in the modern urban sector, which we will call "urban 
unskilled" or simply "unskilled," and jobs in agriculture. Full participation in 
the labor force is assumed. 
The decision to demand education depends on three sets of factors: the pecuniary 
costs of education in relation to the individual's expectation of the financial bene­
fits he will receive, the non-pecuniary (or psychic) costs to him of going to school 
in relation to the non-pecuniary benefits of being an educated person, and the abil­
ity of the individual (or his family) to incur the direct costs today in order to re­
ceive future benefits. 
his demand decision, he must have some notion of what future labor market conditions 
will be. Let us suppose that on some basis or other, which need not conform to ob­
jective reality, he forms a subjective expectation of future events. If he is edu­
cated and enters the skilled labor market, his assessment (denoted by superscript i) 
1
This formulation is consistent with either (1) a neoclassical production
-function such that the marginal product of an uneducated worker in a skilled job
is always less than the wage he must be paid, or (2) a production function with 
fixed coefficients. 
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of his expected income at each point in time is equal to the wage he expects to 
receive in the skilled labor market if he is employed (W!(t)) multiplied hy his 
assessment of the likelihood that he will be employed in the skilled market if he 
is educated ( c/Jis(t)). Making allowance for discounting of future benefits (at rater) 
and dying or otherwise permanently dropping out of the labor force (at rate o), the 
present discounted value of anticipated earnings for individual i if he is educated 
and decides to enter the skilled labor market is 
-(r + o)t
(1) VESi = r WSi (t_) "' i (t) e dt-6 .,,ES 
We shall denote the present value of i's expected lifetime income if he is educated 
the labor market for unskilled jobs by vEt. Similarly, vut and vu! areand enters 
respectively the present values of expected lifetime income if he is uneducated and 




VUU, and VUA may be constructed in a directly analogous manner to (1). 
and VU
i be respectively the present value of i's expected earnings if 
he enters what he thinks is the highest-paying labor market open to him with alter-
native educational qualifications. Then 
i ivi(2) = max (VES VEU)E 
i i
(3)and vi = max <vuu ' VUA).u 
For expositional ease, let us assume that it takes one period to acquire an 
education and the direct out-of-pocket costs are some amount C. The income foregone 
during this period is the current unskilled wage (Wii) times the probability of being 
i sum of these is the private cost of education.employed in that period (c/>U). The 
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Since education takes one period and the benefits do not begin until the 
i vifollowing period, we must subtract from the earnings streams VE and U expected 
earnings in the current period. We therefore have the present value of expected 
. i i i i i i
incremental benefits of educat1.0n equal to (VE - w8 <1> 8) - (VU - WU¢U). Taking the 
difference between expected benefits and costs, we find that the expected present 
value of investment in education for individual i (PVi) is 
(4) 
When deciding whether or not to demand education, in addition to financial 
considerations, each person also considers the non-pecuniary costs to him of going 
. 1 
to school and the non-pecuniary benefits of being an educated person. If the sum 
of the expected net pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits is positive, he will wish to 
be educated. This wish to be educated will be translated into effective demand for 
education if the potential student is able to pay the direct costs of schooling. 
However, if the sum of total net benefits is negative or if the student cannot pay 
the school fees, education will not be demanded. Let the present value of the ex-
i
pected net non-pecuniary benefit for the i'th individual be denoted bv N and let 
i 
8 represent a dichotomous variable having the value one if the i'th family can ob-
tain financing for direct schooling costs and zero otherwise. Then the individual 
demand for education function is 
Di= 0 otherwise, 
and the aggregate demand for education is 
(6) D = f Di. 
1
These non-pecuniary costs may he negative, i.e., the student may enjoy going 
to school more than working. 
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We have said nothing so far about how subjective expectations are formed. 
Supposing that they bear~ (not necessarily perfect) relation to labor market 
reality, the simplest labor market assumptions consistent with this supposition are 
that individuals regard today's wage rates and probabilities of becoming employed, 
being fired, and dying as prevailinr, forever. Interpersonal differences in either 
non-pecuniary preferences for education or access to capital would cause the total 
demand· for education to vary directly with the "objective" private present value of 
educat'ional investment, i.e., 
f 1 1(8) D = f(PV), > o, 
The specific values underlying these expressions depend both on the size of the edu­
cated labor force and on the allocation of the labor force between the various labor 
markets. The specific labor market outcome depends on the behavior of educated workers 
and their employers. In the next section, four models of labor market behavior are 
presented. 
3. Four ~odels of Labor Market Behavior 
The literature concerning the labor market behavior of workers and employers 
in the less developed countries with respect to education offers two general con­
clusions. First, educated people do as a rule accept lower-level jobs, presumably 
when it is to their personal advantage to do so. 
2 
Second, employers in many countries 
1
See quadrant (iii) in Figures 1-3 below. 
2
Figures collected by the OECD (1969) for 53 countries show that while the 
highly-educated are much more apt to be in the professional or managerial occupations
than persons with less education, a high degree of educational attainment is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for entry into the most lucrative and prestigious
occupations. 
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appear to be using educational attainment as a criterion for hiring and selecting 
1the better-educated in preference to those with less education. This suggests that 
the bumping model (to be described below) may be a better general description of 
labor market behavior in the less developed countries than the other models. How-' 
ever, since the available evidence in no way rules out the applicability of the other 
models in other countries, we shall analyze them as well. 
A. The Bumping Model 
In the bumping model, we assume that workers are income maximizers and enter 
that labor force which offers the highest expected income. Furthermore, we suppose 
that employers prefer to hire persons with more education at the prevailing constant 
wage rate. Preferential hiring may take place because the educated are (or are be­
lieved to be) more productive than the uneducated, because employers prefer for non-
economic reasons to associate with the better-educated 1 
2 
or (some argue) because the 
educated elite seek to legitimize their own positions at the top of the pecking 
order by using an "objective" criterion like educ:·atbnal attainment to exclude others. 
3 
If it is profitable (in an expected value sense), we would expect that some sur­
plus educated persons would move to the front of the queue for the unskilled _iobs 
and be hired first at the unskilled wage rate, 11bumping 11 a less-educated person from 
a job. Uneducated workers in unskilled jobs might be fired and replaced immediately, 
or instead displaced over time as uneducated retirees are replaced by the educated. 
For simplicity, we will assume zero frictional unemployment of educated persons in 
the unskilled labor force. 
1
Preferential hiring by educational level is documented in studies of India by 
Blaug, Layard, and Woodhall (1969), of Turkey by Krueger (1971), and of Kenya by Singer 
and Jolly (1973), in a symposium of manpower and education experts (see Skorov (1968)), 
and in a report of the activities of the World Employment Programme of the ILO (see 
Emmerij (1973)). 
2
such a utility-maximizing model is considered in Johnson (1970). 
3See for instance Carnoy (1971). 
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Following our earlier distinction, the uneducated may choose between the urban 
unskilled and agricultural labor forces, but they are excluded from the skilled 
labor force due to lack of educational qualification. In this and the following two 
models, the uneducated are presumed always to choose between these alternatives in 
order to maximize the expected value of their incomes. 
In the bumping model, educated workers are hired first. This means that unedu­
cated workers are left with whatever unskilled jobs the educated workers do not take. 
Thus, education may be demanded in order to receive the advantage of a better relative 
chance of being hired for an unskilled job. It is of course conceivable that after 
a point there may be so many educated persons that the uneducated are effectively 
excluded from obtaining modern sector employment and the relative advantage is very 
great indeed. 
We shall now give a formal statement of the bumping model. Let us first consider 
the advantageousness of the various labor market options open to educated workers. 
If there are fewer educated persons (LE) than skilled jobs (E ), each educated per­5
son can expect to be fully-employed and earn the skilled wage w •5 Over their life­
times, they would expect to earn 
(10) 
for large T. 
Once the educated labor force exceeds the number of skilled jobs, the expected 
wage becomes relevant. We suppose that each worker of a given educational type is 
like any other worker of that type. Hence, the probability of finding a job is the 
ratio of hires to job seekers. Unlike other multi-sector models, we assume that 
workers in one labor market have a finite chance of securing a job in some other 
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labor market. The labor market for skilled jobs is assumed to operate like a 
lottery in which each educated person in the skilled labor force has one ticket and 
each educated person in the unskilled labor force has a j'th of a ticket. Similarly, 
the labor market for urban unskilled jobs assumedly operates like a lottery in which 
each person in the urban unskilled labor force has one ticket and each new entrant 
in agriculture has an n'th of a ticket. 
Let HS be skilled job hiring and JS be the number of skilled job-seeker equiva­
lents, defined as follows. JS is the total number of previously educated persons 
in the skilled labor force (LES) plus the number of persons in the newly-educated 
cohort who decide to enter the skilled labor force (CES) plus j times the number 
of newly-educated persons who decide to enter the unskilled labor force (CEU) less the 
number employed (ES): 
The probability that an educated worker will move from unemployment into employment 
is the ratio of hires to job seekers: 
(12) 
HS, the number of skilled jobs for which hiring is taking place, will be regarded 
as a constant. Let the probability that an employed skilled worker will become un­
employed be a constant value 1/Js· Then, taking the current values of PS and w8 and 
projecting them into the future, the worker's expectation of the probability that 
he will be employed at some future time t has been shown by Johnson (1971) to be 
-12 -
(13) 
As a result of thic-: assumed expectation formation, the present value of lifetime 
income expected by an educated person in the skilled labor force (VES) is 
T ws PS 
(14) VES = ) ws </> -(r + 6)t dt = rS e r + 6 + 6 + PS+ 1/JS 
0 
The present value of expected lifetime income for an educated person in the unskilled 
labor force (VEU) may similarly be shown to be 
(15) = r + 6 r + 6 +PS+ ijJS 
provided the educated workers have not filled all the unskilled jobs. 
Educated workers are assumed to allocate themselves between the two labor mar-
kets so that the equilibrium condition 
is satisfied. This is not expressed as a strict equality, because there may not be 
enough educated people to create a volume of unemployment in the skilled sector 
sufficient to reduce VES to a level which strictly satisfies an equality condition. 
In other words, for a small surplus of educated workers and a large skilled-unskilled 
wage differential, the present value of expected income would he higher in the skilled 
labor market than in the unskilled market even if all the surplus educated were to 
be un.employed. 
The labor markets for the uneducated may be formulated in a similar manner. 
Uneducated persons may choose between the urban unskilled and agricultural labor 
forces. By assumption of the bumping model, educated persons are hired first for 
unskilled jobs. Therefore, the number of unskilled jobs available to uneducated 
workers is the total hiring for unskilled jobs (H 
6 
, which we take as constant) 
minus the number of persons in the newly-educated cohort hired for unskilled jobs 
The number of uneducated job-seeker equivalents for unskilled jobs is 
where n, the rural-urban relative job-search parameter, is the relative chance of 
finding an urban unskilled job for an uneducated person in the agricultural labor 
force as compared to· a person in the urban labor force. Today's probability of an 
uneducated urban worker finding unskilled employment is therefore 
(18) pu = and 
thepresent value of expected lifetime income of an uneducated worker in the un­
skilled urban sector is 
(19) 
r + o +Pu+ !/Ju 
Similarly, for an uneducated worker in agriculture, 
(20) 
r + o +Pu+ !/Ju 
nPU + 
r 
WA+ o (1. - nPu), 
assuming that agricultural jobs are available at wage WA. By the assumption that 
uneducated workers are-income maximizers, they will allocate themselves between 
the rural and urban labor markets so that the present values of expected income 
in each are ·equal, i.e., 
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In the less developed countries the modern sector is small relative to agriculture 
and only a small fraction of the population is educated. It is therefore reason-
able to expect that there would always be enough uneducated persons to fill the 
available unskilled jobs and (21) is always satisfied by a strict equality. 
B. The Labor Market Stratification Model 
(1) Labor Market Stratification on the Supply Side 
In contrast to the bumping model just described, education in less developed 
countries has sometimes been criticized for inculcating the few fortunate students 
with the feeling that they are superior to the masses (see Myrdal (1968)). Carried 
to its logical conclusion, the implication is that the educated would ·always seek 
high-level, high-status jobs and never seek or accept low-level jobs which would 
"dirty their hands," even if they could earn more by doing so. In such an economy, 
any surplus educated persons would always be in the labor force for skilled jobs 
and never consider employment in unskilled jobs. In such circumstances, labor mar­
kets are stratified by considerations of status and prestige. 
(2) Labor Market Stratification on the Demand Side 
Suppose that educated persons are willing to work in unskilled jobs but em­
ployers refuse to hire the educated, because they believe that the educated are 
more apt to have low morale, resulting in lower productivity while on the job, greater 
absenteeism, and more frequent quits. The labor market is also stratified in this 
case, because it is fruitful for the educated to search only for the skilled jobs. 
As in the previous case, any extra educated persons will be unemployed in the skilled 
labor force and never underemployed in an unskilled job. 
These two cases, although causally distinct, are analytically equivalent and 
will be treated so subsequently. 
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\ 
Formally, the labor market stratification model is identical with the bumping 
model except that the educated workers do not allocate themselves between the 
different labor markets according to (16) and LEU=~= 0. 
C. The Pooling Model 
The bumping model assumes that educated workers are favored by employers and 
hired in preference to the less educated for unskilled jobs. The labor market 
stratification model (demand side version) assumes just the opposite. The pooling 
model embodies the third possibility: that education is neither a'help nor a hin­
drance in one's search for an unskilled job. In the pooling model, we still regard 
education as necessary for the skilled jobs, We have, however, a large pool of 
workers searching for the unskilled jobs, these workers being undifferentiated by 
educational attainment. In the pooling model, the unskilled jobs are divided be-
tween the educated and uneducated according to some random process. 1 
~quations (10) - (14) continue to hold in the pooling model. However, educated 
workers are no longer favored for unskilled jobs. Since they may be unemployed in 
the unskilled labor force, they cannot expect to earn WU if they are unsuccessful 
in obtaining a skilled job. Rather, in each period, they would expect to earn W,.4>,.,
u u 
where q,U is the probability of being employed in the unskilled sector. By analogy 
with (15) the present value of expected lifetime income of an educated worker who, 
enters the unskilled labor force is now 
PS
(15') u ·p +EU 
= 
r + o r + o +PS+ ~s J s (1-jPS). 
1
The educated may have better contacts and therefore better chances of being
hired. However, we neglect this possibility. 
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Unlike the bumping model, educated workers are not hired preferentially for un­
skilled jobs, so (18) is replaced by 
(18 I) p = 
u 
and J is now the original unskilled pool plus the new entrants to the unskilled 
u 
labor force plus n times the number of new entrants to the agricultural labor force 
minus those employed: 
(17') 
The present values of expected income of uneducated workers in the urban and rural 
sectors are as before (19) and (20). The other relations, including the equilibrium 
conditions (16) and (21), are unchanged. 
D. The Bright Lights of the City Model 
1The bright lights of the city model embodies the view held by some that the city 
exerts an overwhelmingly strong pull on those who come in contact with it. This 
model postulates that as a consequence of the "bright lights of the city" no workers, 
whether educated or uneducated, once in the city would ever return to the farm. We 
y_-,.; 1 1 and ".L.L..L' 
if it is profitable to do so, bump the less educated out of unskilled jobs. 
The bright lights of the city model is formally identical to the bumping model 
except that we must add the additional constraint 
(22) ~½JA _:: 0. 
1 see for instance Little (1965). 
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4. Demand for Education Schedules Under Alternative Labor Market Conditions 
In order to explain the persistence of a strong demand for education despite 
educated unemployment, we wish to analyze the effects of a larger number of educated 
workers in each of our labor market models. This involves deriving demand for edu-
cation schedules as a function of the size of the educated labor force. 1 A general 
expression for the change in the demand for education if the educated labor force is 
enlarged may be found by differentiating (8) and (9) with respect to LE: 
(23) 
Let us now see what these schedules look like in each case. 
A. The Case of Labor Market Stratification2 
Consider first the labor market stratification model. For a sufficiently small 
educational system, at the existing wage level, educated persons might be in short 
supply. In this range, each educated person can expect to be fully employed. This 
does not change if the size of the educated labor force were to increase, Rrovided 
a<t>sthere continues to be a shortage. Since <f>s = 1, it follows that-.-= 0 and
avE aLE
--= o. Furthermore, by choosing between the rural and urban unskilled labor forcesaLE 
in order to maximize their expected incomes, uneducated persons will reallocate them-
selves so that the probability of obtaining an unskilled job is unchanged in equili­
av0
brium, which implies~= 0. Any other reallocation would cause there to be a
E 
1
The decision by the educational authorities concerning the size of the school
system might be made on the basis of a manpower plan, estimates of the social costs
and benefits of educating another person, or political or social considerations.
Some observations in this regard may be found in a companion paper dealing with the
allocation of resources to education in less developed countries (Fields 1973)). 
2
The order of presentation of the four models has been changed for expositional
purposes only. 
_,q_ 
higher expected income in one labor market as compared to the other and would not 
be an equilibrium since income-maximizing workers would migrate in order to erode 
such temporary differential. Substituting the above into (23), we have 
= ·-
aPV = O. We therefore find that when there is a shortage of educated workers 
aLE 
the present value of investing in education and the demand for education will remain 
unchanged if another person is educated. 
Once the educational system has produced more than enough educated workers 
fill all the skilled jobs for which hiring is taking place, each educated personto 
must expect to be unemployed part of the time. The greater the number of educated 
skilled job seekers there are, so the lower will be the probabilitypersons, the more 
and in turn the lower the present value of becoming educated.of finding a skilled job, 
elf) 
aLE < O, and our model implies that when there is a surplus of educatedHence, 
workers in the case of labor market stratification the demand for education will de­
cline as the educated labor force increases. 
It corres­These results are illustrated graphically in Figure 1. Zones I and 
pond respectively to shortages and surpluses of educated workers. In quadrant (i), 
we see that the present value (PV) is constant while there is a shortage of educated 
workers and declines monotonically thereafter. Taking an illustrative D = f(PV) 
function in quadrant (iii), we derive the demand for education as a function of the 
educated labor force,shown as D = g(LE) in quadrant (iv). We.see that if labor mar­
kets are stratified, after a point the larger the size of the educated surplus in 
a country all other things equal the smaller the demand for education. 
B. The Case of Bumping 
In the bumping case, there are four distinct zones depending on the number of 
educated workers relative to the number of jobs. For ease of reference, these four 
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The Demand for Education in the Case of Labor Market StratificationFigure 1. 
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Table 1 
Labor Market Zones in the Bumping Model 
Zone r. Fewer educated workers than skilled jobs 
Zone II. Surplus of educated workers, 
and are unemployed 
all enter skilled labor force 
Zone I!T. Bumping occurs, i.e., some educated workers enter the un­
skilled labor force and are hired preferentially 
Zone IV. All modern sector job vacancies are filled by educated persons 
The first zone is defined by a shortage of educated workers relative to skilled 
jobs. Since the skilled wage is higher than the unskilled wage, all educated workers 
would enter the labor force for skilled jobs and be fully employed. 
A second zone begins when there first occurs a surplus of educated persons rela­
tive to skilled job hiring. For some small surplus of educated workers, there would 
be sufficiently little educated unemployment and a sufficiently high probability 
of being employed that the present value of expected lifetime income of an educated 
worker in the skilled labor force (VES) would continue to be greater than the pre­
sent value of expected income of an educated worker in the unskilled labor force 
(VEU). This being the case, income-maximizing employees would choose partial em­
ployment/partial unemployment in the skilled labor force in preference to full-time 
employment at a lower wage in the unskilled sector. 
Zones I and I! in the lrnmping model are formally equivalent to the labor market 
stratification case just described. Therefore, the pattern of the demand for educa­
tion as a function of the educated labor force (constant over Zone I and falling 
over Zone II) also holds in the bumping model. 
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After some point, there would be sufficient unemployment that VES would be 
driven down and equal to VEu· This point marks the beginning of a third zone, in 
which it would be profitable for educated workers to bump uneducated workers out of 
unskilled jobs. Once Zone III begins and employment in the unskilled labor force 
becomes profitable, the demand for education no longer declines monotonically with 
the number of educated persons. Rather, we find that 
When bumping is taking place, educated and uneducated workers, each choosin~ 
between the various labor market alternatives open to them in order to maximize 
their expected incomes, will allocate themselves so that the private rate of 
return and the demand for education will remain constant as more persons are 
educated and the educated labor force gets larger. 
When bumping is taking place, educated workers are choosing between the skilled 
and unskilled labor markets so that the present values of expected lifetime income 
in each (VES and VEU) are equal. If the markets are in such an equilibrium and 
another person is educated, the equilibrium will initially be disturbed. If the 
additional educated worker enters the skilled labor market, his presence causes the 
probability of finding a skilled job to fall and thereby lowers the present value of 
expected income of an educated worker in the skilled labor market below what he could 
earn in the unskilled labor market. This would induce other educated workers to 
leave the skilled market and enter the unskilled market, which raises the probability 
of finding a skilled job. Equilibrium is restored when there has been suffictent 
shifting to raise the probability of employment in a skilled.job (~S) and the ex­
pected skilled income (VES) back up to their original levels. The same adjustment 
process and resultant equilibrium follow if the additional educated workers were to 
have initially entered the unskilled labor force. 
Turning now to the markets for unskilled workers, the presence of additional 
educated persons in the unskilled labor market reduces the number of jobs available 
to uneducated workers and thereby lowers their probability of employment. The urban 
unskilled labor market is now less attractive than agriculture and income-maximizing 
uneducated workers find it to their advantage to return to or remain on the farm. As 
theydo this, the probability of an uneducated worker finding an urban unskilled job 
increases and v rises relative to VUA' After sufficient out-migration of unskilled00 
workers from the urban sector, the unskilled labor markets will equilibrate with the 
probability of obtaining an urban unskilled job and the present value of expected 
income of an ureducated person unchanged from their original levels. 
We have therefore shown that when bumping is occurring and another person is 
educated, the reallocation of the labor force between the various labor markets will 
leave unchanged the present values of expected incomes for workers in each labor 
market. Hence the present value of investing in education and the demand for educa­
tion will also remain the same in the zone where bumping is taking place. 
Bumping could continue until educated workers are hired to fill all unskilled 
job vacancies. After that point, a final zone would begin with educated workers com­
peting amongst themselves for both skilled and unskilled jobs and uneducated workers 
1
effectively excluded from breaking into tle modern sector. If society were to decide 
. .. . ,,. . ,- 'I • .. .. .. • -'Ito educate another person this would add to cne numoer or seeKers ror SK1LLeo J~u~, 
which would lower the probability of an educated worker finding a skilled job and 
lower the expected income if one is educated. The expected income of an uneducated 
worker, which is the lifetime agricultural wage, would remain the same. Therefore, 
the present value of investing in education and the demand for education would de­
cline the larger the educated surplus in Zone tV. 
The demand for education for alternative supplies of educated labor in the case 
of bumping is summarized in Figure 2. 
1 
nue to seniority prov1s1ons and other reasons for job fixity, uneducated workers 
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Figure 2. The Demand for Education in the Cases of Bumping and Pooling. 
C. The Case of Pooling 
In the pooling model, there are four distinct zones. The first two are identi­
cal with those of the bumping model. After there is sufficient unemployment to re­
duce VES to VEU' there begins a third zone in which some surplus educated workers 
enter the pool of workers for unskilled jobs but unlike the bumping model are not 
hired preferentially. After a point, there begins a fourth zone in which uneducated 
workers do not find it profitable to enter the urban unskilled labor force and that 
market contains only educated workers. These zones are summarized in Table 2. 
/ 
Table 2 
Labor Market Zones in the Pooling Model 
Zone I. Fewer educated workers than skilled jobs 
Zone lI. Surplus of educated workers, all enter skilled labor force
and are unemployed 
Zone ITT. EducatedcWorkers enter the unskilled labor force but are not
hired preferentially 
Zone IV. Uneducated workers have vacated the unskilled labor force 
We shall show that the pattern of the demand for education as a function of the 
educated labor force shown in Figure 2 also holds in the pool'ing model. In the 
pooling model, the allocation of the labor force as another person is educated in Zones 
I and II is the same as in the bumping model since the two are analytically equiva­
lent. Thus, the demand for education is constant in Zone I and falls in Zone II. 
There is one important difference between the bumping and pooling models, however, 
and that is that Zone III in the pooling model begins later. This is easily understood 
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economically. In the bumping model, an educated worker who chooses to enter the 
unskilled labor force earns the unskilled wage WU and is fully-employed. In the 
pooling model, he is only partially employed, so the present value of his expected 
income is lower. Con~equently, the opportunity cost of being unemployed in the 
skilled labor force when there is pooling is less than when there is bumping. Workers 
would therefore be expected to tolerate more unemployment in the pooling case than 
in the bumping case. 
Once Zone III is reached and educated workers begin to enter the unskilled labor 
force, the pooling model predicts a pattern which the reader may find surprising: al­
though educated and uneducated workers in the urban unskilled labor market are paid 
the same wage and have the same probabilities of employment, if another person is 
educated, educated workers would replace uneducated ones in the unskilled urban labor 
market. Viewed in terms of job search opportunities, this makes good economic sense. 
By being in the cities, educated workers have a better chance of obtaining high­
paying skilled employment than if they were on the farm. The movement of uneducated 
workers between the urban unskilled and agricultural labor markets assures that the 
present values of expected income are equal. This means that educated workers can 
earn the same wage in the city as on the farm and yet while in the city have a better 
chance at a skilled job. Thus, we would expe~t-that educated workers would settle in 
the cities. As they do, this adds to the pool of seekers for unskilled jobs, lower­
ing the probability of finding one, reducing the present value of expected income in 
the city below the present value in agriculture, and driving uneducated workers (who 
havethe least to lose) back to the farm until the present values arec:gain equal. Thus, 
the demand for education would be constant for alternative educational supplies in 
Zone III. 
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Note that if educated workers did not have this improved job search opportun­
ity, the only change when another person is educated would be that there would be 
one more person in the· urban unskilled labor market with education rather than 
without, but there would be no migration into (or back to) agriculture. 
Finally, in Zone IV, VUU < VUA and uneducated workers have vacated the urban 
sector. Except for starting with a larger educated surplus, this zone is formally 
equivalent to Zone IV in the bumping model and all previous results obtain. 
1D. The Bright Lights of the City Case 
The bright lights of the city model is a variant of the bumping model. Rather 
than behaving in a pure expected income-maximizing ~anner, workers are assumed to 
maximize income subject to the behavioral constraint that no one living in the 
city would move back to the farm even if he could expect to earn more there. 
This behavioral limitation has no effect on the outcomes in Zones I and If, 
since there is migration of both educated and uneducated workers into the cities. 
However, once bumping begins, the bumping model requires there to be migration back 
to the rural areas in order to preserve equilibrium between the labor markets for 
uneducated workers. Since this is not allowed in the bright lights of the city model, 
the uneducated labor markets would be in disequilibrium. This raises an intriguing 
possibility: 
When bumping is taking place in the bright lights of the city model, the
labor force allocation will be such that the private rate of return and the
demand for education would be expected to increase if more persons are educatedand the educated labor force gets larger. 
1This model was first suggested in my "Private and Social Returns to Educationin Labour Surplus Economjes," Institute for Development Studies, University ofNairobi, Discussion Paper No. 104, April, 1971, a revised version of which is pub­
lished as Fields (1972a). In neither version, however, was the prohibition againstout-migration from urban areas made explicit. 
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Why might this be expected? If another person is educated, the large number of 
educated workers will choose between the skilled and unskilled labor forces so as 
to leave the present value of expected incomes in the two markets equal to one another 
and unchanged from their original levels. This requires that at least1 one educated 
worker enter the urban unskilled labor force. There is now one less urban unskilled 
job available for the remaining uneducated workers. As a result, the probability of 
an uneducated worker obtaining an urban unskilled job falls) and this lowers the 
expected urban irtcome for an uneducated worker below what he could earn in agricul­
ture. However, by assumption of the bright lights of the city model uneducated 
workers would not leave the city, so the disequilibrium is not eroded as in the 
bumping model. The present value of expected income of an uneducated worker there­
fore falls. The combined effect of a constant expected income for the educated 
worker and a lower expected income for the uneducated is, of course, to raise the 
present value and hence the demand for education. 
Finally, Zone lV begins when there is such a large surplus of educated workers 
that uneducated workers have no chance of being hired for unskilled jobs and there 
will be unemployment of the educated in both the skilled and the unskilled labor 
0markets~ If another person is ~ 11 r~~~~, the more educated persons there are seeking 
a given number of jobs and so the lower the probability of any given educated worker 
being employed. This lowers the expected value of being eP.ucated, which in turn 
lowers the demand for education. 
The demand for education schedule in the bright lights of the city case is shown 
graphically in Figure 3. For ease of comparison, the demand for education schedules 
derived for the four labor market models are shown together in Figure 4. 
1
There will be only one if educated workers employed in unskilled jobs have 
no chance of obtaining a skilled job, more than one otherwise. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
We have described several alternative accounts of possible labor market be
­
havior by workers and employers in less developed countries. Our analysis
, as 
summarized in Figures 1 - 4, suggests three possible explanations for the 
persistence 
of a high demand for education despite unemployment and underemployment of
 substantial 
numbers of educated persons. 
One possibility is that the scenario described by the bright lights of the
 city 
a range during which the demand rises as the size of the educated labormodel 
force is increased -- essentially describes the particular labor market cir
cumstances 
and particular stages of development of at least some less developed coun
tries today. 
However, the validity of the bright lights of the city model has not been 
established 
. 1
by rural-urban migration studies to date. 
A second possibility is that the demand for education may be relatively in
elas­
tic with respect to private returns. This may be because education is dema
nded pri­
marily for the consumption or non-pecuniary investment benefits it confers
 and not 
Alternatively, itfor those financial returns which are measured by present values. 
may be because the present value is already so large that education is obv
iously a 
sound personal financial investment and virtually everyone wants it. The a
vailable 
evidence is fully consistent with the latter position. 
2 
A third possible explanation for the persistence of a high demand for edu
cation 
is that the present value of investing in education may be relatively inel
astic with 
respect to the supply of educated workers. To my knowledge, this hypothe
sis has 
not as yet been subjected to empirical test. 
1rhis is the conclusion reached by Frank (1971) after a thorough review of 
the 
rural-urban migration literature. 
2
See Psacharopoulos (1973) and Section 1. 
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It should be remarked that these three possibiliites are in no way mutually 
exclusive. Rather, they reinforce each other and,to the extent each is correct, 
they provide sound economic reasons for expecting the private demand for education 
to remain strong despite the existence of a large and growing surplus of educated 
workers in the labor market. This prediction challenges the view that the sustained 
demand for education results from over-optimistic labor market expectations compared 
to reality. 
This conclusion suggests an important policy implication for educational 
planning. Suppose that in light of a ~urplus of highly-educated workers and upon the 
advice of experts in the area, the government of a less developed countty were to 
decide to reallocate its educationsl budget away from secondary and higher education 
and toward primary education. In the short run, the government could simply adjust 
supply in the desired manner. However, in the absence of complementary measures to 
reduce the demand for secondary and higher education, the people would continue to 
push for more high-level educational facilities. Not only might the political 
pressures on officials tend to subvert the reallocation program but the people might 
also (as they did in Kenya)join together to construct their own private or community
' 
-~ -rt•""":'lt-oA T.TnY"lr.o,.-C!~uLp..1-ua V.L c....,u.._a.1.,..:.-v "'_.._._..___..__ •-·---1- ~
Thus, in order for a governmental program to reallocate educational resources to 
be effective, steps must be taken to reduce the private present value of investing 
in education. 
We have seen that the private returns to investing in education deoend on the 
earnings and employment probabilities of educated workers relative to the uneducated 
and the private costs of acquiring an education. This points to the areas where 
leverage might be exerted. One possible means of reducing the size of the private 
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present value is to introduce an incomes policy, either by narrowing nominal skilled­
unskilled wage differentials or by making the tax structure more progressive. Another 
is to cause employers to question whether preferential hiring by educational level 
1is really necessary. Yet another is to charge students a larger share or perhaps 
even the full cost of their schooling; students who receive higher education could 
. 2 
be charged full costs, to be repaid over their working lives. 
None of the proposed changes would be easy to implement, given the political 
power of the groups whose interests would be adversely affected. But when one con­
siders the deleterious effect on the economic and social development of a country 
of continuing to spend scarce public funds to produce a well-educated and unemployed 
few while many others could be made literate, there is cause for concern. 
1 on this point, see Blaug, Layard, and Woodhall (1969). 
2Alternative loan schemes are considered in detail in Fields (1972b). 
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